Wednesday, April 30, 2008

Sanity

It would be the sanest thing in the world to assume that one is sane, yet it would be insane to believe that there is a Sanity.

Monday, April 14, 2008

Truth in Music

This article from Spiked Online on music's impact on public thought and culture takes a few interesting (if not particularly fruitful) detours into discussions of trueness of Truth, but a few of its quotations are particularly well-chosen.

"We know the truth, not only by reason, but also by the heart." --Pascal
"There is no truer truth obtainable / By Man than comes of music." --Robert Browning

Nietzsche might have said the same things if he didn't take delight in obtuseness.

Friday, April 11, 2008

Truthiness reconsidered?

I wonder if there may have been an overreaction to the philosophical problems posed by Truthiness by the likes of Susan Jacoby, Frank Rich, and myself. The robust and protective theories of Truth advanced in opposition to Truthiness are probably perceived by their targets as an overly stuffy response to an issue most people would rationally never consider. These approaches demand that individuals perform their inquiries with rigorous methodological requirements to qualify as “acceptable inquiry,” while the majority of everyday people are ill-equipped for that kind of rigor, yet will be compelled to inquire nonetheless. Curiosity is a universal trait, even if the capacity for careful thought is not.

Indeed, the backlash from the intellectual chastening of sloppy inquiry may push the masses to the opposite method of inquiry (revelation) because of the alienation created by failing to meet the elites’ standards for philosophic or scientific inquiry. Ironically, the undermining manipulation of discourse comes about precisely because of an over-concentration on what meets the standards of “Truth,” while we could simply be talking about which ideas are “truer.”

Tuesday, April 8, 2008

Religion

I am not against religion per se. I am, however, against anti-rationality. I have no problem with people holding irrational beliefs. It's when the irrational beliefs require the rejection of rational beliefs that they become problematic.

Saturday, April 5, 2008

Pretty True

When used by academics, “Truth” is a noun. Ordinary people don’t know how to wield this word, but they do use its cousin “true” as an adjective quite effectively.

Tuesday, April 1, 2008

Binary Star

I am not exactly sure whether or not my position on Truth has changed since I writing my senior thesis. I think it's roughly the same, but I can't be sure.

***

The prototypical activity of analytical philosophy is ascertaining the "truth-value" of a proposition. In undergraduate "Logic" classes, this usually involves assigning a dramatically reductionist value of either "T" or "F" to the propositions signified by similarly reductionist letters "A" through "D." These assessments of "Truth" or "Falsity" are based on metaphysical manipulations entirely divorced from any actual interplay of the propositions; rather, all the induction takes place in a vacuum and explicitly relies on the veracity of the assumptions built into the problems. Such assumptions include statements like "A is true" or "If A, then B." These are almost always assumptions about Truth of a proposition and the absolute and immutable relationships between those propositions. Logic, as a discipline, is internally consistent and holds a vivid appeal for those with an analytical frame of mind. Indeed, like most good philosophy, formal logic does not impose any particular content or subject matter on one's inquiry; rather, it claims to equip the inquirer with the tools necessary to deal with his or her own philosophical problems.

While these formal logic games work well enough within their own constructed vacuum (much like Economics), the assumptions these games rely on often render their conclusions oddly inapplicable by human beings. After all, how often do we have reliable assumptions about whether or not a given proposition is absolutely true or false such that it can be manipulated in the precision-demanding ways contemplated by logicians? Furthermore, a truth-value is merely a human assessment of a proposition's efficacy at describing some experience; to claim that something is True because of some "external" verification misses the perspectivist's point that any of these validating mechanisms are channeled through some human perception at some point, making such Truths inherently reliant on human assessments of reality at some point (whether through repeated and shared experience or from idiosyncratic moments from an individual's life). If this sounds like an endorsement of any kind of relativism, you should have more respect for the power of human inquiry.

Aside from inquiries into naturalistic phenomena (Science, writ large), the truth-value of almost all of our interesting propositions lies somewhere in the middle of a spectrum running from false to true, not on either pole. This is not to say that we cannot use such propositions fruitfully; indeed, we can and do use propositions that are not fully true or false constantly, we just don't call the ideas "Truths," out of respect for those ideas that we are more certain about. We all must understand that we develop our ideas on the basis of individualized and idiosyncratic experience (which inherently takes lifetimes to tease out), and that not all of our assumptions about the world will be shared by every other members of our political community. Incidentally, this is the reason why attacking someone's logic in an argument is almost surely the wrong strategy; the other person can always default to some assumption that you will be forced to disagree with as a matter of "opinion" that varies based on personal experience.

Indeed, it is incredibly difficult to put amorphous ideas into language such that others will be able to concur with the aptness of the metaphor, especially because these metaphors are often used to describe some set of experience which may not correspond from person to person to begin with. As such, the proper goal of good philosophical inquiry is not to design some metaphor that will be universally adoptable (i.e., an idea that everyone can call True)--that is the goal of political inquiry. The proper goal of philosophical inquiry is to fashion a metaphor that is coherent. An individual's act of philosophy is synthesizing and reconciling various competing theories and propositions about the nature of life, given the arbitrary and contingent perspective of the inquirer. Therefore, the individual needs not find ideas that are universally True; he or she only needs to assemble a set of ideas that will be conducive to the happiest possible life for the inquirer on the basis of his or her idiosyncratic experience. Human experience is too diverse and multifaceted to try to manufacture or impose any set of ideas on people a priori; good philosophy is individualistic, experimental and dynamic.

***

Hopefully, this will have been the last really foundational entry necessary to give the reader a glance at my perspective and a chance to play along with me in my language games. I'd like to be able to exercise a little more creativity in both form and function from now on. If I am ever ambiguous or unclear, please use the comments section liberally; I will respond in kind.