Truthiness reconsidered?

I wonder if there may have been an overreaction to the philosophical problems posed by Truthiness by the likes of Susan Jacoby, Frank Rich, and myself. The robust and protective theories of Truth advanced in opposition to Truthiness are probably perceived by their targets as an overly stuffy response to an issue most people would rationally never consider. These approaches demand that individuals perform their inquiries with rigorous methodological requirements to qualify as “acceptable inquiry,” while the majority of everyday people are ill-equipped for that kind of rigor, yet will be compelled to inquire nonetheless. Curiosity is a universal trait, even if the capacity for careful thought is not.

Indeed, the backlash from the intellectual chastening of sloppy inquiry may push the masses to the opposite method of inquiry (revelation) because of the alienation created by failing to meet the elites’ standards for philosophic or scientific inquiry. Ironically, the undermining manipulation of discourse comes about precisely because of an over-concentration on what meets the standards of “Truth,” while we could simply be talking about which ideas are “truer.”